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REGULATING THE ORGAN MARKET: 
NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR 
MARKET REGULATION 
I. GLENN COHEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article, the first of two I have contributed to this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems, I do two quite different things. First, in part II, I 
attempt to map normative arguments against the sale of organs onto regulatory 
proposals for “organ markets.”1 Those who oppose organ sale may do so for a 
number of different normative reasons, independently or in conjunction, and 
my goal is to show whether someone who opposes the sale of organs for X 
normative reasons can nonetheless support some forms of a regulated organ 
market. My goal might also be put in more positive terms: to show those who 
are unsure about whether organ markets are a good idea what forms of 
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 1.  By “market,” here and throughout, I mean the term in its broadest sense—that is, I envision a 
market at work any time an organ is provided due to the inducement of monetary or nonmonetary 
compensation, in whole or in part. Thus, whether one is providing one’s organ for cash, burial benefits, 
priority in an allocation for other organs, or so one’s relative can get an organ as part of a chain, in my 
nomenclature an organ market is operating. What kinds of organ exchanges are not markets then? 
Those in which the only motivation for providing the organ to another is altruism. “Altruism” is itself a 
somewhat problematic term, and whether, as a conceptual matter, it makes sense to draw such a sharp 
line between the utility from the warm glow of charitable motivation and the utility from the less warm 
glow of gold remains to me an open question. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, 
the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 701 (2003) 
[hereinafter Cohen, The Price of Everything] (“One might object to this point by claiming that a gift is 
not a ‘something for nothing’ exchange, but rather an exchange in which the giver receives something 
of value in return.”); Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the 
World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683, 689, 695 (“We may not be able to determine or quantify the 
determinants that encourage the gift, but the mere fact that it is made means that there is 
compensation, direct or indirect, not only to the person who received it, but also to the person who 
made it . . . [i]t is only because the utility of the donor is increased by the enhanced wealth of the donee 
that the transaction makes sense from the point of view of the participants.”). Some might prefer to use 
the locution “exchange” instead of “markets” to describe some of what is left over in a regulated 
market, and for those for whom this terminological change makes a difference I invite them to read in 
“exchange” for “market” throughout.  
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regulation would make organ markets worthwhile to pursue. In part III, I add 
to the literature on regulated organ markets by engaging a particular type of 
argument related to just distributions that has been offered as a reason to be 
concerned about organ markets. More specifically, I press on the assumption 
that the distribution of organs in systems where compensation is prohibited is 
itself a just baseline against which to measure the distribution that results when 
compensation is permitted. 
II 
MAPPING NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS ONTO REGULATORY PROPOSALS 
There is a developed literature (full disclosure, I have written in it myself) 
providing various arguments against organ markets and/or refuting those 
arguments.2 There is also a developing literature on potential regulations or 
redesigns of the organ market that would be desirable.3 There has been less 
dialogue between these two literatures than one might expect, in part, I suspect, 
because (1) those who seek to offer arguments to ban the organ markets 
altogether have been less interested in helping to shore up their opponents’ 
positions or provide mechanisms by which their concerns may be blunted, and 
(2) because many who are interested (or have sophisticated training) in deep 
normative questions of freedom, rights, and justice find themselves less 
interested (or have less sophisticated training) in regulatory-design questions, 
and vice versa. 
To further that dialogue, in this part I will map normative arguments against 
organ markets onto proposals for regulated organ markets to examine which 
normative theories would lead one to oppose which forms of regulation. In so 
doing, I am very self-consciously suspending evaluation of both the normative 
arguments and the regulatory proposals presented.4 The goal is to generate 
 
 2.  See, e.g., CÉCILE FABRE, WHOSE BODY IS IT ANYWAY?: JUSTICE AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
THE PERSON (2006); MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY 
PARTS (2006); DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF MARKETS 189–207 (2010); I. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of 
International Markets for Organs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269 (2013) [hereinafter Cohen, Transplant 
Tourism]; Gabriel M. Danovitch & Alan B. Leichtman, Kidney Vending: The “Trojan Horse” of Organ 
Transplantation, 1 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1133, 1133–34 (2006) ; Leon R. Kass, Organs 
for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of Progress, PUB. INT., Spring 1992, at 65, 77; Julia D. 
Mahoney, Altruism, Markets, and Organ Procurement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 24–26 
(Summer 2009); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Rotten Trade: Millennial Capitalism, Human Values and 
Global Justice in Organ Trafficking, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 197 (2003). 
 3.  E.g., F. Ambagtsheer & W. Weimar, A Criminological Perspective: Why Prohibition of Organ 
Trade Is Not Effective and How the Declaration of Istanbul Can Move Forward, 12 AM. J. 
TRANSPLANTATION 571, 574 (2012); Cody Corley, Money as a Motivator: The Cure to Our Nation’s 
Organ Shortage, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 114–119 (2011); Sara Naomi Rodriguez, No 
Means No, But Silence Means Yes? The Policy and Constitutionality of the Recent State Proposals for 
Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws, 7 FIU L. REV. 149, 177–99 (2011); Lara Rosen et al., Addressing the 
Shortage of Kidneys for Transplantation: Purchase and Allocation Through Chain Auctions, 36 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 717, 718 (2011); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited 
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1837–40 (2007). 
 4.  If you want to know what I think about each, see my work in Cohen, The Price of Everything, 
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hypothetical imperatives of the form “if you believe X, then regulatory proposal 
Y is something you should oppose” or “ . . . support.” I will initially present the 
normative reasons one by one largely for expositional ease, but of course many 
individuals may subscribe to multiple normative concerns about the sale of 
organs, in which case we would need to trace the effect of each of those multiple 
concerns onto which forms of regulation to support or oppose. The table 
presented at the end of this part, which shows the mapping in a visual form, may 
make it easier to do this tracing. 
Before beginning this analysis, though, it is worth noting a way in which this 
framing exhibits a certain amount of status quo bias. My analysis takes the 
current nonmarket system as given and asks what normative concerns have 
been expressed at moving to a market system. Because the focus of this issue is 
potential law reform, I think that starting point makes sense. However, it is also 
worthwhile to imagine the question through the looking glass as well. Imagine 
we were in a market system and there was a proposal to move to a nonmarket 
system. One could undertake a parallel analysis to the one I offer below on 
whether to adopt the nonmarket system. That analysis would involve 
considering both new normative concerns, such as whether we would “lose” 
organs from the system—a reverse of the usual crowding-out argument I discuss 
below—as well as some concerns that are common to both analyses but might 
look quite different from the other side.5 
A. Normative Concerns 
1. Corruption 
The basic idea behind what I have elsewhere called the “corruption” 
argument is that allowing a practice to go forward will do violence to or 
denigrate our views of how goods are properly valued.6 This argument is 
sometimes labeled the “commodification” argument, but because that term is 
also used in a way that encompasses some of the other arguments I discuss 
below, I prefer the more specific label of “corruption.” The American Medical 
Association, among others, has voiced this kind of objection in the domestic 
 
supra note 1; Cohen, Transplant Tourism, supra note 2; and my chapter on transplant tourism in I. 
GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS: MEDICAL TOURISM, ETHICS, AND LAW (forthcoming 
2014) (on file with the author). 
 5.  For example, one might be concerned that coercion is more serious a concern in a nonmarket 
system, where the ties of family and friendship can place significant pressure on the decisions of 
potential donors. Moreover, if the argument I make in part III is accepted, one might think that there 
are distribution concerns with moving to a nonmarket system and not merely in moving in the other 
direction.  
 6.  See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 
111 (2012); Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 1, at 691–92; cf . Margaret Jane Radin, What, if 
Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, Address at McGeorge School of Law (March 4, 1994), in 26 
PAC. L.J. 135, 143–45 (1995) (discussing similar arguments in the context of reproduction). In her 
article in this issue, Sally Satel takes aim at these kinds of corruption arguments. Sally Satel et al., State 
Organ Donation Incentives Under the National Organ Transplant Act, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 3, 2014 at 217. 
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organ-sale context, suggesting paying kidney donors would “dehumanize 
society by viewing human beings and their parts as mere commodities.”7 
We can distinguish two subcategories of this objection, which I have 
elsewhere called “consequentialist corruption” and “intrinsic corruption.” 
“Consequentialist corruption” justifies intervention to prevent changes to our 
attitudes or sensibilities that will occur if the practice is allowed8—for example, 
that we will “regard each other as objects with prices rather than as persons.”9 
This concern is contingent and to be successful must rely on empirical evidence, 
in that it depends on whether attitudes actually change. By contrast, “intrinsic 
corruption” is an objection that focuses on the “inherent incompatibility 
between an object and a mode of valuation.”10 The wrongfulness of the action is 
completed at the moment of purchase irrespective of what follows; the intrinsic 
version of the objection obtains even if the act remains secret or has zero effect 
on anyone’s attitudes.11 
2. Crowding Out 
This claim has its roots in behavioral economic work on motivational 
crowding out, suggesting that, contrary to the classical economic model, 
allowing payment for goods may change its social meaning in a way that 
discourages altruistic giving.12 The crowding-out objection posits that permitting 
the sale of organs will decrease the supply of organs in some way. There are 
actually four somewhat distinct variants of the argument. One focuses on 
crowding out of donated organs and claims that the number of organs donated 
altruistically will decrease if compensation for organs is permitted. A stronger 
claim is that sale will lead to “crowding out of overall organs,” such that the 
total number of organs, whether procured through altruistic donation or 
compensated donation, will go down—that is, the decrease in altruistic 
donations due to permitting a market will not be outweighed by an increase in 
purchased organs. Third, and perhaps closer to the central thrust of Richard 
Titmuss’s oft-cited work on blood supply is the crowding out of quality organs, 
when even if supply remains constant or increases, the new organs that become 
available will be of inferior quality, that is, diseased or unusable, as compared to 
those that are available in a market where compensation is prohibited.13 This 
 
 7.  Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n, Financial Incentives for Organ 
Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 581, 581 (1995).  
 8.  Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 294–97 (1991); Cohen, The 
Price of Everything, supra note 1, at 692 n.13. 
 9.  Altman, supra note 8, at 296. 
 10.  Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 1, at 692 n.13. 
 11.  Id.; see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 144, 172 (1993) (offering 
what I think of as this kind of corruption argument). 
 12.  E.g., BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL 
MOTIVATION (1997). 
 13.  See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY (1970).  
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objection might also hinge on the claim that methods of detecting poorer 
quality organs are unavailable, or if available are infeasible for financial or 
other reasons.14 Such an argument might also point to the crowding out of one 
source of organs for another less good source, for example, crowding out living 
organ donation in favor of deceased organ donations.15 A final variant of the 
argument is less concerned about the effects on supply as such, but more about 
a kind of coarsening of sensibilities or “crowding out of opportunities for 
altruism or altruistic geelings” more generally. Of course, this depends on a 
prior view that we care about motivation independent of its effects on supply, 
and also that that “altruistic” motivation is one we want to valorize. A skeptic 
might think that “altruistic” organ donation is itself problematic, either because 
unpaid organ providers, unlike their paid counterparts, are unable to self-insure 
against future health problems, or because unpaid providers face more pressure 
from friends and family to donate, making their choice less autonomous. In any 
event, I think this version of the crowding-out concern is better thought of as a 
subset of the consequentialist-corruption argument mentioned above, so, in 
what follows, I will not treat it as a separate normative concern. 
3. Coercion, Exploitation, Undue Inducement, and Justified Paternalism 
This is a family of arguments concerned with the harming or the wronging of 
the organ seller. Although there is some loose family resemblance between 
these four types of concerns, they are, as I have argued elsewhere, often 
improperly run together and are quite distinct.16 
“Coercion” is the claim that poor sellers are improperly forced into selling 
their organs by brokers or recipients who have no right to propose this, because 
the sellers have no reasonable economic alternative.17 The easiest example of 
coercion in a potential organ market would be when someone is literally forced, 
by threat of violence to themselves or a loved one, to donate.  But many who 
 
 14.  As Goodwin makes clear, Titmuss’s claim about the blood supply was premised on a lack of 
technology to appropriately determine whether blood provided by individuals was diseased or not, but 
we now have the requisite technology for blood and certainly for organs. GOODWIN, supra note 2. 
Further, Titmuss seemed to assume that it was commercially supplied blood but not altruistically 
donated blood that provided the contamination risk; in fact, as Goodwin suggests, a good deal of the 
blood contamination of the 1980s was due to altruistic donation by gay men in an era before the HIV 
virus was widely known to be transmitted through blood transfusion. Id. Satel makes a similar point 
and also discusses empirical evidence on whether crowding out is likely in her article in this sympoisum. 
Satel, supra note 6. Michael Volk discusses the effect of low-quality organs on ameliorating the organ 
shortage in his article in this issue. Michael L. Volk, Organ Quality as a Complicating Factor in 
Proposed Systems of Inducements for Organ Donation, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 
337. 
 15.  Cf. Lainie Friedman Ross, Potential Inefficiency of a Proposed Efficiency Model for 
Kidney Allocation, 51 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASES 545, 546 (2008) (providing data that the allocation 
systems favoring younger kidney recipients on the waiting list had the effect of decreasing the number 
of living organ donors to those children). Randy Beard and Jim Letizel discuss similar data regarding 
this possibility in their article for this issue. T. Randolph Beard & Jim Leitzel, Designing a 
Compensated Kidney Donation System, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 253. 
 16.  Cohen, Transplant Tourism, supra note 2, at 273–79. 
 17.  See id. 
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are concerned with coercion have in mind something much more subtle. In what 
is probably the leading bioethical account of the idea, Alan Wertheimer 
suggests that (to use a stylized framing) we imagine A proposing to B,18 
1. If you do X, I will bring about or allow to happen S. 
2. If you do not do X, I will bring about or allow to happen another state of 
affairs, T.19 
Has A then coerced B? Wertheimer provides a two-pronged test for 
whether a proposal constitutes a coercive threat. The first part, which 
Wertheimer names the “choice prong,” determines whether “A’s proposal 
creates a choice situation for B such that B has no reasonable alternative but to 
do X.”20 Importantly, this prong does not ask whether B has some alternative to 
doing X, but rather whether the alternatives available to B are acceptable ones.21 
Indeed, even in the mugger’s demand “your money or your life” the victim has 
some choice, he can choose to surrender the money. Instead, the problem is that 
surrendering one’s life is not an acceptable alternative to turning over one’s 
money; it is too costly an alternative to complying with A’s demand.22 Rather 
than calling for an empirical determination that B has “no choice” but to do 
what A proposes, the choice prong requires a judgment as to whether the costs 
to B of not doing what A proposes are too high.23 What qualifies as an 
acceptable choice is an inherently normative determination. In the case of 
organ markets, it might be argued that the very poor have no acceptable choice 
but to sell their organs in order to support their family, better their life, or, in 
the case of organ markets in Bangladesh or Pakistan, get out of bonded labor.24 
Whether the same lack of acceptable choice would persist in a regulated organ 
market in the United States would, of course, depend on how the sellers are 
screened and who comes forward to sell. 
Finding that the person receiving the proposal has no acceptable choice is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for finding coercion. Wertheimer gives the 
example of a surgeon who refuses to amputate a patient’s leg for a fair price, 
but although the patient had no acceptable choice, we do not think the act 
morally problematic nor would we allow the patient to renege on the 
contractual obligation.25 This points us to the need for a second prong to find 
 
 18.  See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204 (1987); see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 222 
(1986); Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 56 
(2002). 
 19.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 18, at 204.  
 20.  Id. at 172.  
 21.  Id. at 267; see also id. at 272–74. 
 22.  See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens 
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 831 n.162 (2012). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  For a discussion of the relevant data and evaluation of this argument see generally Cohen, 
Transplant Tourism, supra note 2. 
 25.  Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation in Clinical Research, in EXPLOITATION AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 63, 71 (Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel 
eds., 2008); see also WERTHEIMER, supra note 18, at 192–201. 
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coercion, what Wertheimer calls the “proposal prong,” which asks whether the 
proposal is one that A has or does not have a right to make.26 To illustrate, 
Wertheimer offers the following paired cases: 
The Private Physician Case. B asks A, a private physician, to treat his illness. A says 
that he will treat B’s illness if and only if B gives him $100 (a fair price). 
The Public Physician Case. B asks A, a physician, to treat his illness. A is employed by 
the National Health Plan, and is legally required to treat all patients without cost. A says 
that he will treat B’s illness if and only if B gives him $100.
27
 
Although in both cases B has no acceptable alternative but to pursue 
treatment from the surgeon, the first case, unlike the second, seems 
unproblematic at least insofar as the coercion concern; only in the second case 
does A make a proposal he does not have the right to make.28 Therefore, only 
the second case is coercive on Wertheimer’s framework. 
Of course, what kind of proposals one does or does not have the right to 
make is itself an inherently normative inquiry. Wertheimer would incorporate a 
“moral” test to distinguish the two types of proposals,29 whereas legal scholars 
have suggested the existing law could also define what we do and do not have 
the right to propose.30 
As Wertheimer emphasizes in discussing the private physician case, in 
determining whether the proposal prong is met one must “distinguish between 
B’s rights against other individuals and B’s rights against the society or the 
state.”31 If one subscribes to a political theory in which everyone has a right to 
health, “B’s moral baseline with respect to the society includes his right to 
medical care, but his moral baseline with respect to a private physician does 
not,” such that a physician who says he will treat the patient only if paid is not 
engaging in coercion.32 Similarly, we need to distinguish rights claims an organ 
seller might have (on some political theories) against his or her nation state to 
end bonded labor, to provide food, employment, health care, and so on, from 
rights claims as against the organ recipient or broker. Moreover, Wertheimer 
notes his approach leaves open the possibility of distinguishing “between B’s 
background conditions for which A is not responsible and rights-violating 
threats to B’s welfare which are specifically attributable to A.”33 This tracks, for 
example, the difference between demanding a “rescue fee” from a drowning 
person you stumble upon versus one you yourself pushed in the water.34 
 
 26.  See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra 18, at 172. 
 27.  Id. at 207–08. 
 28.  See id. at 208. 
 29.  Id. at 207. 
 30.  Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 16 (2001). 
 31.  WERTHEIMER, supra note 18, at 218. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 219. 
 34.  See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Conscientious Objection, Coercion, the Affordable Care Act, and U.S. 
States, 20 ETHICAL PERSP. 163, 176 (2013) (discussing the importance of distinguishing cases of “taking 
advantage of someone’s existing condition versus putting a person in a condition which you then 
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In sum, as applied to organ markets, the coercion argument requires 
showing that the organ seller has no acceptable choice but to comply with the 
buyer or broker’s offer to purchase the organ, and that the offer of organ sale is 
an offer the buyer or broker does not have a right to make to the seller. 
Someone can be exploited if not coerced and coerced if not exploited. The 
concept of “exploitation” comes in several varieties, but the most prominent 
philosophical account distinguishes harmful from mutually advantageous 
exploitation—a distinction that turns on whether “both parties (the alleged 
exploiter and the alleged exploitee) reasonably expect to gain from the 
transaction as contrasted with the pre-transaction status quo”—and consensual 
versus nonconsensual exploitation.35 
To determine that A has wrongfully exploited B, philosophers usually 
stipulate that two requirements must be met: (1) A benefits from the 
transaction, (2) the outcome of the transaction is harmful (harmful exploitation) 
or at least unfair (mutually advantageous exploitation) to B, and A is able to 
induce B to agree to the transaction by taking advantage of a feature of B or his 
situation without which B would not ordinarily be willing to agree.36 Those 
opposing organ markets will often suggest that even if consensual, organ sales 
can wrongfully exploit the organ seller either because (1) the seller is ultimately 
harmed (harmful exploitation) by the transaction as compared to the 
pretransaction baseline, or more commonly (2) because the buyer induced the 
seller to sell at a given price by taking unfair advantage of the seller’s poverty or 
other need, without which the seller would not have sold the organ. 
Although often labeled as “exploitation,” “undue inducement” is in fact a 
separate, and in some respects, opposite concern about organ sale. In the case 
of exploitation, the claim is that the seller is getting offered too little, a “raw 
deal,” whereas undue inducement is the claim that they are being paid too 
much, the “offer too good to refuse,” such that their autonomy is in some sense 
overwhelmed by the price offered and the decision is (again in some sense) less 
than voluntary.37 
All three of these concerns are to be contrasted with opposition to organ 
sale as a form of “justified paternalism.”38 Such arguments seek to protect organ 
 
exploit.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 35.  See Wertheimer, supra note 25, at 67–68. In her article in this issue, Satel takes aim at these 
kinds of exploitation arguments. Satel, supra note 6. 
 36.  E.g., FABRE, supra note 2, at 142. Fabre breaks the second condition into two, yielding three 
conditions total, id., but I find it more useful to treat the second condition as one. 
 37.  E.g., Cohen, Transplant Tourism, supra note 2, at 276. Once again, by listing this argument I 
do not mean to endorse it. In fact, as my struggling to formulate this particular argument suggests, I am 
especially skeptical of it. I think the strongest formulation would be that the offer of money induces a 
level of bounded rationality in the decision making of the organ seller. 
 38.  Although I find it helpful to sever exploitation and justified paternalism in this way, there is a 
relationship between the conditions for justified paternalism and the distinction between consensual 
and nonconsensual exploitation. However, that latter distinction presumes that there is exploitation 
afoot, whereas those making arguments about justified paternalism may be concerned that the 
transaction not go forward even if the seller is not being exploited. 
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sellers from making the “wrong” decision. Typically, these arguments look to 
see whether purported consent to sell the organ is really consensual in a more 
robust sense of the term. That is, they think whatever formal consent the seller 
gives, be it contractual or otherwise, falls short because it is involuntary, 
uninformed, or otherwise invalid because the seller lacks competence or 
capacity to sell the kidney. These arguments would forbid what appears to be a 
voluntary transaction by pointing to at least one of these defects in the consent 
process and by the presence of anticipated harm to the seller.39 
4. Unfair Organ Distribution 
A final set of arguments concerns “unfair organ distribution” to those who 
would have received an organ in the status quo state of the world where sales 
are not permitted. There is some relationship between this and the crowding-
out arguments discussed above, but the two are independent in that the supply 
of organs could increase due to permitting sale and yet the distribution of organs 
could change in a way that makes the distribution less just (I will have more to 
say in Part III about under what conditions such changes in distribution are in 
fact less just). This is, in a sense, the difference between Kaldor–Hicks and 
Pareto conceptions of efficiency. The distribution of organs that results from 
permitting a market (as compared to the distribution where markets are 
forbidden) would be superior from a Kaldor–Hicks perspective—there are 
winners, those who get organs because they can purchase them, and losers, 
those who would have received them in the no-compensation mode, and the 
gains to the winners are larger than the losses to the losers such that in theory 
the winners could compensate the losers and still remain ahead. By contrast, the 
new distribution is not Pareto superior, which would require that no one be 
made worse off and at least one person made better off. Those who would have 
received the organ if the system did not permit compensated sale have been 
made worse off, even if many more now receive organs because of the system 
change that permits compensation. I will have a bit more to say about the 
normative assumptions of this argument in Part III, but for now I merely want 
to get the argument on the table. 
Although perhaps not quite exhaustive,40 this is a fairly good list of the 
arguments offered against organ sale. It is also worth emphasizing that the listed 
arguments are representative of those typically offered for blocked exchanges 
more generally—selling surrogacy services, gametes, sex, and so on. Many of 
the potential regulations discussed below might also be used as potential 
 
 39.  In my own work I have suggested that justified paternalism, though seldom trumpeted, 
provides one of the strongest arguments against allowing organ sale, although that is in part a relative 
comparison based on my conclusion that the other arguments are more problematic than they might at 
first appear. COHEN, supra note 4; Cohen, Transplant Tourism, supra note 2, at 273–79. 
 40.  For example, Debra Satz’s chief concern with such markets relating to “equal status 
considerations” and antihierarchy principles, see SATZ, supra note 2, at 197–99, might be thought to be 
a separate objection or instead a combination of the exploitation, consequentialist, and intrinsic-
corruption objections. 
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regulations for these other markets. Thus, although my focus here is on 
mapping the normative and regulatory dimensions of organ markets, the work I 
do is, I hope, of more general purchase as well. 
B. Regulatory Options 
A series of regulatory interventions have been discussed in the literature. 
Again, my focus here is not on evaluation but merely to provide a thorough 
listing. Again, although I will list these potential interventions one by one for 
expository simplicity, many serious regulatory proposals will combine more 
than one of these options. 
1. Price Controls 
The state or another body could control the price of organs. This could be 
done by establishing a set price per organ, or establishing price floors or price 
ceilings. 
2. Restrict the Form(s) Compensation Can Take 
Instead of limiting the amount payable for organs, we can instead limit the 
forms that compensation might take, restricting it to nonmonetary forms of 
compensation. In a recent challenge to the U.S. National Organ Transplant Act 
(NOTA), the challengers proposed to recompense bone marrow donors with 
noncash compensation: “MoreMarrowDonors.org, a California nonprofit 
corporation[, claimed it] wanted to offer $3,000 awards in the form of 
scholarships, housing allowances, or gifts to charities selected by donors, 
initially to minority and mixed-race donors of bone marrow cells.”41 As Sally 
Satel details in her article for this issue, Pennsylvania also passed a law that 
would have given modest reimbursement of hospital or burial expenses of a 
deceased donor, but the plan was ultimately never implemented due to concern 
it would have violated NOTA.42 
Some forms of nonmonetary compensation, such as offering someone a 
house or a car in return for their organs, might be thought to be so similar to 
cash payments as to be indistinguishable from the moral point of view.43 A more 
promising response to the normative concerns is programs that limit organ sale 
to compensation in kind. In some variants the trade is an organ for an organ. 
The simpler version is simultaneous paired kidney exchange. As Healey and 
Krawiec describe it, 
 
 41.  I. Glenn Cohen, Selling Bone Marrow—Flynn v. Holder, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 296, 296 
(2012). 
 42.  Satel, supra note 6. 
 43.  See Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 1, at 696 (“To divide all goods into two 
spheres, one of money goods and one of non-money goods—to focus only on blocking sales and not 
barters—is to fetishize money. Money is merely a more convenient way of accomplishing barter in the 
absence of a double coincidence of wants; there is no reason to think that trading your child for a 
Volkswagen is any less problematic than trading the child for money. The anticommodificationist thus 
has no principled reason to block sales and not barters.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Within each patient–donor dyad, the donor’s kidney is incompatible with the patient’s 
immune system—yet it is suitable for the patient in the other pair. There are thus two 
donor–patient pairs, each incompatible internally but compatible with their counterparts. 
The obvious solution is a straightforward, simultaneous swap of kidneys between the two 
dyads. With the right combination of compatibilities across dyads, simultaneous swaps of 
three or four or even more pairs are possible in principle. In swaps of this sort, parties to 
the exchange cannot back out in the middle of things—either everything happens at 
once, or nothing does. Although multi-way pairings are possible in principle, they are 
rare in practice because the logistical demands of organizing simultaneous swaps grow 
rapidly as the number of pairs increases. Each individual in the swap requires her own 
surgical theater and team, either to remove the donor kidney or to transplant it into a 
recipient. Doing all of this at once is very difficult. As a result, simultaneous kidney 
exchanges typically involve only a limited number of swaps.44 
A more recent innovation is nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor 
(NEAD) chain. In NEAD chains “an altruistic donor freely gives a kidney to a 
patient, initiating a chain of transplants among a series of donor–patient pairs” 
but because “[e]ach donor has a kidney that is incompatible with ‘her’ 
patient, . . . each donates her kidney to the compatible patient of another 
donor–patient pair, forming the next link in the chain.”45 NEAD chains require 
both altruism and trust, in that to initiate a NEAD chain one needs “an 
altruistic donor, who gives a kidney without having a particular recipient in 
mind” and this “extra” kidney means “the transplants do not need to take place 
all at once,” rather a “patient can have her donor pay it forward later—say, 
when another suitable patient–donor pair is found.”46 Trust is necessary because 
there are, at present, no enforceable contracts between donors in the NEAD 
chain, and the literature “contains several accounts of bridge donors who failed 
to perform on their promise to pay a kidney forward.”47 
A different form of in-kind compensation involves giving organ donors 
priority for future organ distributions. For example (to simplify somewhat), 
some have proposed that “those who committed to donate would receive a 
significant advantage in the organ allocation process, if they later needed a 
transplant,” enabling them, “like military veterans seeking a government job, to 
be placed ahead of non-donors of slightly superior qualifications on the waiting 
list.”48 Israel has, indeed, recently adopted a system of this sort as described in-
depth in Jacob Lavee and Avraham Stoler’s article in this issue.49 While the 
public U.S. system does not incorporate this form of compensation, it has 
somewhat been accomplished here by a voluntary system called “Lifesharers” 
 
 44.  Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L.J. 
645, 651 (2012).  
 45.  Id. at 647.  
 46.  Id. at 652 (emphasis omitted). 
 47.  Id. at 657. 
 48.  Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Commentary, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ 
Donations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 314 (2005). 
 49.  Jacob Lavee & Avraham Stoler, Reciprocal Altruism—The Impact of Resurrecting an Old 
Moral Imperative on the National Organ Donation Rate in Israel, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 
2014 at 323. 
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in which “organ donors join by designating that, in the case of their deaths, their 
organs should first go to other members of the LifeSharers network” and 
“[o]rgans may only be shared with those outside the network when there is no 
matching recipient within the network.”50 In their article for this issue, Stephen 
Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner discuss other types of nonmonetary 
compensation, some of which come very close to monetary compensation while 
staying within the bounds of U.S. law.51 
3. Restrict Who Can Buy or Sell Organs 
The state can establish that only authorized persons or entities can buy 
organs. This might take the form of outlawing brokerages or at least referral 
fees. It might also take the form of establishing a monopsonistic government 
buyer while outlawing private sale. The Iranian organ system in theory (at least) 
works in this way, with government being the only lawful buyer of organs and 
then distributing the organs it acquires according to criteria that are not based 
on willingness to pay.52 Randy Beard and Jim Leitzel recommend such a 
monopsonistic governmental agency in the model they set out in their article in 
this issue.53 
A separate set of proposals would “prequalify” sellers. This might include 
excluding poor sellers altogether by requiring that a seller have a gross taxable 
income above a certain threshold or, perhaps more sophisticatedly, a measure 
of wealth and need, not simply income. It might also involve psychological or 
medical screening of sellers to indicate low likelihoods of adverse events due to 
the surgery or being without the organ in question following the donation. One 
could also imagine legal prescreening of donors and sellers, in analogous to 
some of the devices used for surrogacy agreements. For example, the state of 
New Hampshire 
statutorily requires judicial pre-clearance for a surrogacy agreement to be enforced and 
demands that the intended parents must be examined and a licensed child placement 
agency or the Department of Health and Human Services must perform a home study to 
verify that the intended couple can provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, medical 
care, and other basic necessities.54 
 
 50.  Christopher Tarver Robertson, From Free Riders to Fairness: A Cooperative System for Organ 
Transplantation, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 12 (2007). 
 51.  Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 289. 
 52.  As one set of Iranian scholars relatively recently described it, Iran has robust regulation of 
kidney selling—all renal-transplantation teams belong to universities and the costs of the transplant are 
paid by the government with no incentives allowed to transplant teams. Sellers are provided health 
insurance and an award from the government, and most are also provided a “rewarding gift” arranged 
before the agreement from the recipient or a charitable organization. The Iranian Society for Organ 
Transplantation carefully monitors all transplants for ethical violations. See generally Ahad J. Ghods & 
Shekoufeh Savaj, Iranian Model of Paid and Regulated Living-Unrelated Kidney Donation, 1 CLINICAL 
J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1136 (2006). As with most things pertaining to Iran, it is quite difficult to 
get a good sense of how the system actually operates in practice.  
 53.  Beard & Leitzel, supra note 15. 
 54.  I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
423, 469–70 (2011) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §168-B:16 to 18 (LexisNexis 2010)) [hereinafter 
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One could imagine a similar, court-supervised process in which contracts 
paying for organs are rendered enforceable after (1) the court inquires about 
whether buyer and seller are (a) adequately represented by counsel, (b) of 
sound mind, and (c) not coerced in the basest sense, and (2) the money is put in 
escrow pending performance. Such prescreening could also involve “cooling 
off” or “waiting periods,” as Beard and Leitzel note in their paper.55 
4. Restrict What Kinds of Organs Can Be Sold or For What Purposes 
A final category of regulations involves determining which organs can be 
sold. One simple division is to permit the sale only of cadaveric but not live 
organs. In addition or separately, the system might permit the sale of only 
certain kinds of organs. The National Organ Transplant Act’s prohibition on 
sale, for example, only prohibits the sale of a “‘human organ,’ defined as 
‘human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, 
cornea, eye, bone and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ 
(or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation’” and therefore does not 
cover “all animal organs, . . . blood, ova and sperm.”56 Another form of division 
would be between renewable and nonrenewable organs (or bodily substances). 
These distinctions can be drawn even more finely, and recently a panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the National Organ 
Transplant Act’s prohibition on selling organs did not apply to “peripheral 
blood stem cells” obtained through apheresis, although it did prohibit the sale 
of the same stem cells derived when derived through aspiration.57 
A different variant of this approach is to limit the uses to which organs may 
be put. The National Organ Transplantation Act does this by not prohibiting 
sale of organs when used for research and other nontransplantation activities.58 
Similarly, “as of 2007, [thirteen U.S.] states independently banned either the 
sale of human embryos for research purposes and/or the sale of human ova to 
produce embryos for research purposes, while New York, on the other hand, 
has now explicitly allowed it.”59 
5. Other Measures 
Finally, there is a more heterogeneous set of limitations one might impose 
on an organ market while leaving the sale intact. The first is to permit the 
 
Cohen, Regulating Reproduction]. 
 55.  Beard & Leitzel, supra note 15. 
 56.  I. Glenn Cohen, Can the Government Ban Organ Sale? Recent Court Challenges and the Future 
of U.S. Law on Selling Human Organs and Other Tissue, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1983, 1984 
(2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006)) [hereinafter Cohen, Can the Government Ban Organ Sale?]. 
 57.  Flynn v. Holder, No. 10-55643, slip op. at 10, 15, 18 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011), opinion amended 
and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012); see Cohen, Can the Government 
Ban Organ Sale?, supra note 56, at 1983.  
 58.  Cohen, Can the Government Ban Organ Sale?, supra note 56, at 1984.  
 59.  Id. at 1984 (citations omitted); see Feminists Choosing Life of N.Y., Inc. v. Empire State Stem 
Cell Bd., 926 N.Y.S.2d 671, 678 (App. Div. 2011) (permitting sale).  
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market but prohibit advertising.60 Another possibility would be to permit sale, 
but forbid contractual enforcement of the promised exchange, such that an 
individual who contracted to supply a kidney would not be able to enforce that 
agreement in court. As we saw, the possibility that one party might defect is 
already a cause for concern in NEAD chains. More subtle versions of this 
approach make the contract enforceable but permit only damages rather than 
specific performance, or make the contract voidable but not void such that the 
seller of the organ can go through with the contract or void it at her election but 
the same is not true of the buyer. 
 
C. Mapping Normative Concerns onto Regulatory Options 
Now that we have a full, though admittedly not completely exhaustive, 
account of the normative concerns with and the regulatory options for organ 
markets, we can start connecting them. 
If one’s concern with organ markets is consequentialist corruption, it is an 
empirical question as to whether any of the regulations discussed will blunt the 
attitude-modifying effects about the status of the body or human beings that 
represents the chief concern with authorizing organ markets. As such, one 
cannot definitively endorse or reject any of the regulations until we run 
appropriate experiments with the various regulations and develop appropriate 
measures of attitude modification. Of course, doing either, and certainly doing 
both, of those things would be extremely difficult—one of the reasons why I 
think this argument may be rhetorically persuasive, but in practice not 
particularly grounded in evidence—so perhaps the best we can make are 
“guesses” about the effects of various regulations on these attitudes, with the 
proviso that armchair empiricism is no substitute for the real thing. 
Limiting the form that compensation might take to, for example, 
MoreMarrowDonors.org-type scholarship funding, or organs received from the 
in-kind trading of organs that occurs in NEAD chains or simultaneous paired 
kidney exchanges discussed above, seems most likely to blunt the effect of 
consequentialist corruption. If one is convinced that these alternative benefits 
are part of the same or a closely allied “sphere” or “modes” of valuation as 
organs,61 then these kinds of exchanges may have fewer attitude-altering effects 
than do exchanges for money. Similarly, making government the monopsonistic 
buyer of organs may cause us to regard organs as a special good and not a pure 
market or use good. It might also, though, have the opposite effect, and 
government participation in purchases might be seen as legitimating the 
 
 60.  Cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 136 (1996) (arguing for a ban on 
advertising for prostitution as a way of trying to fight complete commodification by “failing to 
legitimate the sales we allow” and as a way of adding information costs to potential buyers to 
discourage them). 
 61.  E.g., Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 1, at 692; ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 144. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which the “stranger” and more limited the kinds of goods for which organ 
exchange is permitted, the less likely it is that the public will come itself to think of organs as pure 
market or use goods.  
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economic way of valuing organs. Limitations on the use to which organs may be 
put after purchase might also help forestall attitude modification, especially if 
the uses are thought of as noble or of collective instead of individual benefit—
such as restricting the use of organs to scientific purposes. To the extent that the 
attitude changes about the body and human beings that we want to avoid are 
keyed to living bodies rather than the dead, and/or there is more of a tendency 
of corrupted attitudes towards organs to become corrupted attitudes about the 
value of human beings when the human beings from whom the organs come are 
alive, then limiting sale of organs to cadaveric organs may be desirable on this 
view. To the extent that advertising augments the attitude-modifying nature of 
commodified exchanges, a ban on advertising might mitigate this normative 
concern. And to the extent that state participation, even in the seemingly 
neutral form of contract enforcement, is thought to have an expressive effect, 
endorsing the attitude that the organ is a market good, forbidding contractual 
enforcement may be viewed as desirable as well. By contrast, it may be 
counterproductive to limit enforcement to the damages rather than specific 
performance if the damages remedy is thought to further express an attitude of 
commodification towards the good. 
Might setting price controls also assist in avoiding the attitude-modifying 
effects of organ sale? Elsewhere I have argued for adopting a “Formula from 
the Nature of the Transaction,” which “does not focus on the nature of the 
goods, but rather on the nature of the transaction.”62 With roots in Kant’s work, 
I have suggested that part of what makes gifts of organs and other “sacred” 
goods permissible and not corrupting is that giving—in contrast to sale—does 
not express a notion of “value equilibrium.” With sale, however, “the 
transaction is thought to have no ‘value remainder’ because the two sides 
receive things of equal value” or at least equal value to them.63 Price ceilings or 
fixed prices may also have the effect of expressing a certain amount of value 
remainder in the transaction: Although the parties would ordinarily ask for 
more in terms of price, the state prevents that by fixing a price or prohibiting its 
sale above a certain amount, such that the transaction does not suggest that the 
price actually paid represents the full value of the organ being sold, and hence 
the value remainder. On the other hand, an intervention that fixes the price 
paid for organs may express a certain interchangeability—all organs are equal—
that makes the organs seem more like widgets and less like something with 
special nonmarket value—such as art—making matters worse not better in 
terms of attitude modification. 
Intrinsic corruption is focused not on changes of attitudes towards the good, 
but instead on the more metaphysical concern that the value of the good is 
denigrated by the mere incompatibility of the modes of valuation, such that 
wrongfulness of the action is completed at the moment of purchase irrespective 
of what follows, even if no attitudes change. As I have explained in more detail 
 
 62.  Cohen, The Price of Everything, supra note 1, at 703. 
 63.  Id. at 705. 
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in other work (albeit with some skepticism), on some views, “[e]ven if one 
concedes that good X (your child, your vote) is denigrated when treated as 
equivalent to money, the questions remain whether there are other goods that 
you can exchange X for that will not denigrate it, and how many types of such 
goods there are.”64 That is, “if the problem is the exchange of things that have 
radically different spheres of valuation, then the philosophical battleground will 
be in defining how wide the various spheres are and the extent to which they 
overlap.”65 There are many ways of formulating the different “widths” of 
spheres of valuation, but let me highlight two that are particularly relevant for 
our purposes. First, one that I associate with Michael Sandel suggests a 
tripartite division between market goods, civic goods, and sacred goods, 
wherein exchanges across categories are problematic but exchanges within a 
category are not problematic (or at least less so).66 
On this view NEAD chains and simultaneous paired kidney donations, 
although still market exchanges, are not (or are at least less) problematic 
because they exchange one “sacred” good (a body part) for another. 
Lifesharers and other organ-priority enhancers for donors are similar in that the 
goods exchanged both come from the “sacred” good sphere of “organs.” 
Indeed, a version of Lifesharers, or priority, where the benefit to donation was 
related to health or the body but not organs per se—for example, priority in 
influenza-vaccine inoculation, ICU-bed access, compensated elder care—might 
also be unproblematic on this logic. 
A second theory of sphere width, which I have discussed elsewhere, restricts 
noncorrupting exchanges to those where the good is “of the same ‘type,’ as that 
term is used narrowly in ordinary language, has its own sphere (for example, 
trading one cat for another cat is an exchange of two goods within the same 
type, whereas trading a cat for a vehicle is not).”67 On this theory, NEAD chains 
or simultaneous kidney exchanges are permissible, because they are a trade of 
“my” organ for “your” organ, but attempts to use organ donation as the basis 
for priority as to other health benefits, such as vaccines, are problematically 
corrupting. 
As with consequentialist corruption, restricting sale to cadaveric organs 
might also satisfy those concerned with intrinsic corruption, but here the 
question is not whether individuals perceive or react to the severing for 
compensatory-seeking purposes of parts from dead bodies differently from 
living ones, but whether, at a metaphysical level, living bodies and dead bodies 
are to be differently valued, such that market exchange does violence to the way 
we think the latter but not the former is to be valued. Some of the forms of 
regulation I suggested might be endorsed by those concerned about 
 
 64.  Id. at 696. 
 65.  Id. at 696–97. 
 66.  Id. at 697 (citing Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in 21 
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94, 112 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000)). 
 67.  Id. at 697. 
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consequentialist corruption—price controls that force a certain amount of value 
remainder in the transaction, making government the monopsonistic buyer, 
limiting the uses to which organs might be put, and so on—might also be 
endorsed by those concerned with intrinsic corruption to the extent these 
limitations reduce the actual denigration of the good, metaphysically speaking, 
and not merely our reactions to the exchange. By contrast, other regulations 
endorsed to fight consequentialist corruption, such as bans on advertising and 
perhaps state enforcement of contracts, are more focused on the 
communication of corrupting messages and less germane when the concern is 
intrinsic corruption. 
For the crowding-out concern, in any of its forms, once again we face an 
empirical question, and one for which existing studies are not at all supportive 
that the crowding-out effect is a real one.68 Assume, though, for the sake of 
argument, that the introduction of a market in organs did substantially crowd 
out supply. What might counteract the effect? It is unclear whether something 
like a fixed price or a price ceiling is likely to help maintain the existing level of 
altruistic donation—if it keeps the organ valued at a low level, perhaps 
individuals will not think of themselves as “chumps” if they give the organ 
away—or whether it will actually make supply worse than allowing the market 
to set the price—for it may be that both fewer individuals will donate and that 
the regulator’s price does not incentivize enough compensated donation. One 
can also imagine the practice of monopsonistic government purchase of organs 
as in theory being better than an unregulated market in terms of crowding out, 
because of the identification of the seller with civic mindedness in participation 
with a government program; or worse, if an act of charity now feels more like 
paying one’s taxes or other types of interactions with the government. The 
introduction of opportunities to participate in NEAD chains, simultaneous 
paired donation, or priority programs might also plausibly, from the armchair, 
push in either direction, giving a “boost” or “thank you” for altruism or, 
instead, changing the act into one that looks more like a market exchange, and 
make those who donate outright feel like “chumps.” The same is true for bans 
on advertising. Limiting the compensation for organ provision to cadaveric 
donations and/or based on what uses the organs purchased can be put to, might 
cause potential donors to better segment domains in which they see markets 
(cadaveric, scientific use) from those where they see charity (live, health-care 
uses).  Alternatively, these limitations might have no effect, or even a perverse 
effect. 
There are many unanswered questions here in need of empirical 
investigation. The regulation that seems to have the most surefire effect on 
dealing with the subset of crowding-out concerns relating to the quality of 
organs is the ability to screen sellers for physical and psychological health. It is 
 
 68.  See COHEN, supra note 4 (reviewing existing evidence); Julia D. Mahoney, Altruism, Markets, 
and Organ Procurement, supra note 2.  
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less clear whether price floors would help address this concern as well. On the 
one hand, the population interested in for-profit sale of organs is likely to 
expand beyond the poor and destitute, which may mean more high-quality 
organs; on the other hand, there may also be more incentive to misrepresent 
one’s health state to have one’s organ purchased at the high price. 
When the concern is coercion, the most useful regulatory interventions will 
be legal and psychological prescreening of the donors as well as waiting 
periods—to help guard against the buyer threatening the seller or otherwise 
putting pressure on him besides for the price term offered—and potentially 
making the government the monopsonistic buyer of organs.69 I say “potentially” 
because although, on the one hand, one would expect the government to be less 
likely than private individuals to threaten an unwilling provider of organs to 
induce him or her to sell, on the other hand, should one face a government with 
this kind of orientation (perhaps this is particularly easy to imagine in other 
countries, or perhaps that is merely a case of wishful thinking) the power of the 
government to coerce is much stronger than that of private individuals. Limiting 
the sale of organs to only cadaveric organs might also be thought to serve as a 
bulwark against coercion, though it is also possible that individuals will be more 
susceptible to being coerced while alive to sell while dead than they would be to 
sell while alive, since they internalize fewer of the negative consequences. That 
may mean individuals are more subject to coercion but the coercion has fewer 
negative effects when it does occur. The prohibition of contractual enforcement 
or making the contract voidable but not void by the seller might, on the one 
hand, ameliorate coercion—the coercive buyer cannot rely on the state to 
enforce the bargain that was the product of coercion—but, on the other hand, 
may be worse for the seller since the buyer will now rely on self-help remedies 
to ensure that the seller complies, which at least in theory may be more 
coercive. 
When exploitation is the concern, price floors or high fixed prices are one 
very pertinent regulatory intervention. This is a remedy that is often overlooked 
by those who claim that exploitation is the chief evil with organ markets. If, in a 
hypothetical transaction for the sale of the kidney (or any good for that matter) 
at X price, one claims that the seller has been exploited, there ordinarily exists a 
hypothetical value for X where the claim is false. As I suggested above, one 
necessary element to claim that a transaction is exploitative is that the outcome 
of the transaction is harmful (harmful exploitation) or at least unfair (mutually 
advantageous exploitation) to the seller on the basis of the terms being offered. 
In this way, exploitation mirrors to some extent the doctrine of substantive 
unconscionability in contract law, which in the words of one classic case looks at 
whether the “contract terms . . . are unreasonably favorable to” one party over 
 
 69.  Of course there are plenty of forms of nonmarket coercion. This is true not just in terms of 
physical threats, but also the much more subtle and yet powerful types of pressures that family or 
friends can place on a potential donor in the altruistic-donation context.  
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the other.70 For every substantively unconscionable set of contract terms, one 
could imagine a hypothetical rewriting of the contract’s terms that would not be 
substantively unconscionable. Similarly, for every sale of organs on terms that 
seem exploitative, one could imagine a set of terms that would not be harmful 
or unfair to the seller, such that they would not be exploitative. A change in the 
price term is one very powerful way of turning an exploitative transaction into a 
nonexploitative one. If the problem is that the seller of a kidney is being 
exploited by being offered the opportunity to sell at a given price, there likely 
exists a hypothetical higher price at which he will not be exploited. 
Should that last sentence read “likely” or “necessarily”? That depends, to 
some extent, on whether one believes that money can always compensate for 
other potential losses and change a harmful or unfair transaction into a 
nonharmful or fair one. For those who believe that money can compensate for 
any losses, there will always exist a price at which an organ sale does not exploit 
a given seller. For those who do not believe that money can compensate, one 
may also have to consider alterations to nonprice terms. Even for the latter 
group, though, a substantial price floor or fixed price will help reduce the 
unfairness or harm of the transaction for the seller and thus make it less 
exploitative. 
Will a limitation to in-kind compensation also reduce the likelihood of 
exploitation? I think not, and in fact the opposite may be true, because it may 
be more likely that provider of the organ will be harmed or treated unfairly. In 
the NEAD-chain example, it is possible that somewhere along the line one of 
the kidney providers will defect (in the game-theoretical sense of the term), and 
a person who provides a kidney in a transaction for the purpose of getting a 
kidney for someone else will end up getting nothing in return. Let us put the 
problem of defection aside, however, and suppose we had an organ-priority 
system whereby the priority is guaranteed by law and we are completely 
confident it will be enforced. It is more likely that a transaction in which one’s 
kidney is “sold” for priority in other organs may be exploitative as compared to 
a case where one’s kidney is “sold” for money. How would one know whether 
one is getting “fair-market value” for the kidney in the priority case? The value 
of the priority is conditional on needing an organ oneself in the future, the 
expected value of which is difficult to anticipate ex ante. Further, the value of 
that priority is a function of how many other people also get priority and how 
many organs are available—if there is a surplus of organs such that everyone 
who wants one gets one, the priority would be useless, and it might be better 
from the point of view of a particular seller to free ride. Thus, it will actually be 
more difficult to know—both from an outside regulatory observer and for the 
person deciding whether or not to “sell” their kidney—whether the value of the 
priority is fair or unfair, as compared to a cash benefit. 
If one believes that brokerages are more likely to offer transactions that are 
 
 70.  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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exploitative, outlawing brokerages will reduce exploitation. It is harder to know 
whether monopsonistic government purchase will help prevent exploitation or 
not. Much would depend on whether one thought governments were likely to 
set a fair and nonexploitative price for organs, or whether the lack of 
competition from other buyers was likely to lead to lower prices that were 
unfair. 
Recall that one of the elements necessary for a transaction to be exploitative 
is that the buyer is able to induce the seller to agree to the transaction by 
unfairly taking advantage of a feature of the seller or his situation without 
which the seller would not ordinarily be willing to agree. The poverty of the 
seller is one such feature of the situation. Therefore, a restriction that 
prohibited poor sellers from selling organs would reduce the chances that this 
element of exploitation would obtain in the organ-sale context.71 Waiting 
periods and psychological and legal prescreening may also reduce the pressure 
on sellers that is a hallmark of exploitation. It is less clear whether prohibitions 
on advertising are a good idea—on the one hand such advertising may prey on 
the poor and downplay risks, but on the other hand advertising may inform 
prospective sellers on what the “going rate” is and facilitate price competition 
among buyers to the sellers’ benefit. 
Limiting organ sales to cadaveric organs rather than live ones might be 
thought to reduce the chance of exploitation by reducing the chance that the 
practice will prove harmful to the seller, although that may in turn depend on 
the question of whether one thinks one can be harmed (or at least exploited) 
after one is dead;72 it may also be possible to be exploited while alive based on 
what will happen to one’s body after one is dead. Limitations of organ sale to 
only certain types of organs may also help ameliorate exploitation concerns by 
making it less likely the seller will be harmed. 
If the concern is undue inducement, the main desirable intervention is the 
setting of a price ceiling or a low fixed price, because lower sums are less likely 
to have this undue inducement effect. Limitations on who may provide organs 
that exclude the poor may also be justified for this set of concerns on the theory 
that a given offer is less likely to be an undue-inducement if one’s preoffer 
holdings make one wealthy and thus less in need of the money. Monopsonistic 
government purchase, to the extent it results in a lower price being offered, may 
also be endorsed on this argument as an intervention, as may some forms of 
limiting the form compensation may take, such as priority based limits. 
Where justified paternalism is the main motive for intervention, 
psychological screening and legal prescreening of potential organ providers, as 
 
 71.  That said, as I have discussed elsewhere, we run into the potential “hypocrisy” problem with 
such an intervention, in that we both block an exchange for poor sellers and do not compensate them 
for the lost opportunity to improve their lot in life, thus causing them to remain poor. See COHEN, 
supra note 4. 
 72.  I have discussed the question of posthumous harms elsewhere, see I. Glenn Cohen, The Right 
Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1139 & n.64 (2008). 
COHEN_REGULATING_BORDERS_EIC_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  4:09 PM 
No. 3 2014] REGULATING THE ORGAN MARKET 91 
well as mandatory waiting periods, may be called for as a way of trying to 
improve the quality of the consent process. Some limits on the form of 
compensation might, in theory, serve a similar function. They may give organ 
providers more opportunity to be reflective about their decisions and/or to 
improve consideration because the payoff is by necessity delayed. Because the 
harms of cadaveric organ provision, if they exist, are largely psychological, 
restricting organ markets to those kinds of organs would also be justified on this 
view. Similarly, restricting organ markets to renewable organs, or those organs 
the removal of which from the provider have fewer negative health 
ramifications on the provider, could also be justified. Monopsonistic 
government purchase of organs might also be called for on this view, if one 
trusts the government to effectively pair informational and libertarian 
paternalist-type interventions, sometimes called “choice architecture,” to help 
counter poor decision making by potential organ providers in the way it 
structures its organ procurement programming. That may be a big “if” for some 
who view government as the problem, not the solution. 
Finally, if the concern is an unfair organ distribution to the ultimate 
recipients, there are a few regulations that might be justified. First, price ceilings 
or low fixed prices for organs may increase the share of the market of 
purchasers who can afford them. Second, monopsonistic government purchase 
can uncouple sale and purchase. Sale becomes legal, but only to the 
government, but purchase becomes illegal and a willingness-to-pay distribution 
system can be replaced with our existing organ distribution system, that is, 
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), or another form of rationing. In 
the next part, I have a bit more to say about this justification for regulating the 
organ market. 
In this part, I have mapped out the main arguments offered against organ 
markets and the main potential forms of regulation of organ markets, and have 
also tried to connect the two to show how certain normative concerns might 
lead one to endorse or oppose certain forms of regulation. That mapping is 
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 One thing that should be obvious from this discussion and the Table is that 
not only do the normative concerns justify different forms of regulation, but in 
some instances they justify conflicting forms of regulation. For example, 
exploitation and undue inducement concerns generate opposite and 
incompatible regulation here because the former is focused on keeping prices 
high through price floors or high fixed prices, whereas the latter is focused on 
lowering prices through ceilings and low fixed prices. Thus, it is particularly 
important to distinguish these two arguments relating to organ markets even 
though many writers in the area confuse them, or at least equivocate. Likewise, 
to the extent the value of the monetary, or for that matter nonmonetary, 
compensation bears a relationship to the total number of organs that are 
procured to the system, and assuming larger rewards result in more organs 
procured,73 the price ceilings or low fixed prices that the undue-inducement 
argument pushes for will exacerbate the crowding-out concern. There may also 
be conflicts between solving exploitation and consequentialist or intrinsic 
corruption concerns. To avoid exploitation, I have suggested regulators may 
want to try price floors or high fixed prices, however, to the extent that what 
saves some of these transactions from being corrupting is the existence of what I 
have termed “value remainder,” that remainder gets eaten up as the price paid 
for an organ is increased. 
This list is not exhaustive and there are very likely other conflicts between 
regulatory possibilities, as well. Thus, if one is concerned by more than one of 
these normative issues, one may have to prioritize and make hard choices. That 
priority will depend not only on an assessment of which of the normative issues 
is more concerning for the reader, but also on an evaluation of which of the 
conflicting regulations is more effective in improving or exacerbating the 
normative concern in question.  That prioritization is important for a second 
reason: while some forms of regulated market seems more desirable than the 
status quo of no-market or a completely free market, there is such a thing as 
death by regulation; that is, it is possible that trying to adopt all of these fixes 
(or at least all nonconflicting ones) would produce a market that is worth more 
than either of the two polar options. The right approach from a system design 
point of view is, I think, to start with the greatest concern for the policy maker, 
adopt the regulations best targeted at those concerns, and then move to the 
next concern at each point asking whether the additional regulation added 
improves or worsens things as against the state of play before it is added on. 
 
 73.  Although such a monotonic relationship between the two variables is the easiest to imagine, it 
is not the only possible one. For example, it could easily be the case that low levels of compensation 
reduce altruistic giving because they simultaneously cause those providing transplanted organs not to 
feel like they are “a hero,” to use a term from Beard and Leitzel, while at the same time ensuring that 
donors are not getting paid nearly enough as market actors (“you want to pay me that?!”). If that were 
the case, it may be that no payment is better in terms of overall supply of organs than only a little 
payment, while a lot of payment is better than either. As with so much of this, without robust 
experimentation it is only possible to make guesses from the armchair about how individuals will 
respond to various market designs. 
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Others might take a different tack in figuring out which regulations to combine, 
but I think prioritization by level of concern will be crucial for any decision 
method. 
III 
UNFAIR ORGAN DISTRIBUTION REVISITED 
Some of those opposed to organ markets are concerned about the resultant 
distribution of organs. As I have said in part II, there may be regulatory 
interventions that can mediate this concern, but for the purposes of this part, I 
am more interested in whether this concern is a justified one. 
As I said above, one way of formulating this concern is that even if the new 
distribution of organs in a world where markets are permitted is Kaldor–Hicks 
superior, as compared to one where it is forbidden, it is not Pareto superior, 
because some of those who would have received the organ if the system did not 
permit compensated sales have been made worse off, even if many more now 
receive organs because of the system change that permits compensation. As a 
descriptive matter, that is accurate. As a normative matter, though, the change 
in the distribution is only significant if we think that the distribution in a world 
where organ markets are prohibited is more just than the distribution in which 
organ markets are permitted. 
We should be careful to distinguish two versions of this concern. In the first, 
and the one I will focus on, one can imagine a system designer choosing 
between the two potential systems, market or nonmarket, at time zero, before 
either has started operating. In this set up of the problem, the complaints of 
those who would have received an organ in the nonmarket system but do not 
receive it in the market system are based on an argument that the “loser” had a 
superior moral claim to the organ. By contrast, in the second version one 
imagines transition from our existing nonmarket system to a market system in 
real time. Here, the same individuals who would have received an organ in the 
nonmarket system but would not receive it in the market system will have a 
complaint, but they will have an additional ground for that complaint: that is, 
they had a legal or moral entitlement under the old system, a sort of settled 
expectation from the prior system design. 
I would not be inclined to give much additional weight to this extra reason. 
This is in part because any change to the regulation of the organ market will 
have this kind of effect on distribution and frustrate the entitlement claim of 
those who say they would have received an organ under the old system. After 
all, if UNOS today changed some aspect of its priority weighting for who gets 
organs that caused a change in the distribution, I do not know that the 
preexisting entitlement should give us much pause if we felt the new 
distribution was more just. Moreover, it is not just changes in the regulation of 
the market or allocation systems that may end up changing who receives an 
organ; changes in technology, such as better tissue matching, or in the manner 
of procurement, such as recruiting more deceased donors, or more donation 
3_COHEN_REGULATINGORGANMARKET_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  4:09 PM 
96 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:71 
after brain death instead of donation after cardiac death, will have comparable 
effects, and yet we do not give the “losers” a veto over such changes. 
In any event, though, one can avoid this issue entirely by imagining—as 
seems likely—that there will be some kind of nonretroactivity or phase-in to the 
system change for organ distribution. In the most extreme form one could 
imagine that we decree that the new organ market would only go into effect 100 
years from now when all existing potential entitlement holders under the old 
system will be dead. Less extreme phase-ins are also possible and indeed much 
more likely, but I use the extreme version just to show how implementation of a 
change might nonetheless get us to something more like the “pure” case 
resembling initial choice by a system designer. 
Do those who would have received organs in a market-prohibited system, 
but would not in a market-permitted system, have a claim of justice against our 
adopting the market system? I want to suggest that there are at least two 
complications with answering “yes” and therefore the answer may be only a 
qualified yes. 
First of all, it will depend on why they got the organ in the market-
prohibited system to begin with. If the organ flows to them through the UNOS 
priority system—which combines a first-come-first-served principle with a 
priority to the worst-off system that focuses on the health sphere, and a best-
outcomes measure focused on antigen, antibody, and blood-type matches of the 
donor and recipient74—then the question arises whether those criteria are 
themselves valid bases for allocating organs. That is a big question, and many 
fine-tuned rationing questions are quite difficult,75 but there is good reason to 
think that even UNOS’s system, which may have imperfections, produces a 
more just organ distribution than does a complete free market where access is 
allocated by willingness to pay. 
However, not all organs end up in the bodies of their ultimate recipient 
through the UNOS rationing system. Many come from directed donations from 
friends and families. Do the subset of individuals who would have received 
organs from friends and families in a market-prohibited system, but do not 
receive those organs in a market-permitted system—either, hypothetically, 
because those donations are completely crowded out or because particular 
individuals who would have altruistically given those organs sell them instead—
have a justice-based complaint relating to the regime change which deprives 
them of those organs? The answer is yes only if such individuals who are now 
“losers” have a superior entitlement to those organs, as a matter of justice, than 
do those who would purchase the same organs. That raises the question of 
whether those who purchase organs are more deserving of those organs than 
those who receive them from altruistic giving by friends and family. I do not 
 
 74.  E.g., Govind Persad et al., Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions, 373 
LANCET 423, 426 (2009). 
 75.  For some of my own thoughts on many of these issues, see I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal 
Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221 (2013). 
COHEN_REGULATING_BORDERS_EIC_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  4:09 PM 
No. 3 2014] REGULATING THE ORGAN MARKET 97 
intend to provide a definitive answer here, but instead just want to hint why, 
when it is understood that this is the right question to ask, the matter is 
complicated and what many take for granted may not be correct. 
One important reason that the distribution of access to a particular good, 
like a life-saving organ, may be unjust is because the distribution is based on a 
morally arbitrary factor. Ability and willingness to pay is sometimes derided as 
a thoroughly morally arbitrary factor, but in my view that is a bit strong. 
Although few who study distributive justice from a philosophical perspective 
would claim that those with wealth fully deserve it free of any moral 
arbitrariness, neither is it the case that no wealth is deserved, that all wealth 
distributions are morally arbitrary. For example, although I may not deserve the 
wealth I get when a distant and unknown relative leaves me a huge bequest, I 
may deserve some of the wealth I get when I invent a novel technology through 
risk, pluck, intelligence, and perseverance. The right question to ask is whether 
ability or willingness to pay is a more morally arbitrary method of allocating a 
scarce good like organs than a competitor allocation principle. 
I do not believe so. Or, to put it more cautiously, it is far from clear to me 
that it is more morally arbitrary than allocation based on the availability of 
friends or family willing or able to donate altruistically as part of directed 
donation. Why should we think I am deserving for having a friend or relative 
who is (1) a tissue match, (2) willing to donate, and (3) fond enough of me to be 
motivated to do so? Of those three joint criteria, only the last seems connected 
at all to my dessert. It is through no doing of my own that I do or do not have 
relatives or friends who happen to be tissue matches. Indeed, whether I have 
siblings or not is a choice my parents likely made long before I needed the 
organ and is now likely too late to rectify!76 Similarly, whether the friend or 
relative is still alive when I need a donation is beyond my control. The 
willingness of my relatives or friends to be organ donors is, likewise, something 
unconnected to my dessert and for which I do not have much control. 
Only the fondness of my friends and relatives for me is something that I can 
perhaps say I deserve. But even here there are many factors outside of my 
control. For example, “I was an army brat so I kept moving high schools and 
thus did not form deep attachments,” or “I was born with autism making it 
more difficult for me to form close friendships,” or “I am a member of a 
disfavored minority group who has experienced significant discrimination and 
have found it harder to make friends.”77 There is arbitrariness in both this and 
the ability or willingness-to-pay criterion, but it is not at all pellucid to me 
 
 76.  One exception is the controversial so-called “savior siblings” case where children are 
conceived in order to be a bone or chord-blood match to an ill sibling. I have discussed these cases in I. 
Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 347, 364 & n.53 (2008) and Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note 54, at 479 n.168. 
 77.  This last example raises the possibility that not only is a system of allocation by donation by 
friends or families somewhat arbitrary, but in fact it may actually be discriminatory to the extent that it 
may reflect existing biases as to who has friends or even family willing to donate. That said, the 
distribution of wealth may also reflect some of the same discriminatory biases. 
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whether one’s ability to purchase an organ is more morally arbitrary than 
whether one has a friend or relative who is a tissue match, willing to donate, and 
fond enough of oneself to be motivated to do so. The question is whether one 
can clearly say one deserves tissue-matching friends and relatives willing to 
donate more than one deserves one’s wealth. It is far from clear that this is the 
case. 
Suppose one concludes that in fact the availability of friends and family to 
donate organs is a morally arbitrary basis for allocating those organs. The 
strong intervention would be to consider making that method of allocation 
illegal, just as willingness to pay is currently illegal in the United States, I am 
not arguing for that here. Doing so would require an inquiry into the proper 
boundaries of impartiality in making decisions that affect intimate associations. 
For example, on some moral-theory views there are “agent-centered 
prerogatives”: In responding to the critique that consequentialism 
impermissibly alienates an agent from his own life projects—that is, requires 
him to pursue certain goals or projects only if they further the aim of 
maximizing aggregate welfare—some have urged a modification in which we 
recognize that, in some cases, an individual may permissibly depart from his 
duty to produce the best overall state of affairs in order to pursue important life 
projects necessary for the integrity of his person,78 such as favoring one’s loved 
ones in moral choices like organ donation. I would also imagine that trying to 
bar familial donations in this strong way would be noxious to most 
Communitarians. 
My point here is less ambitious. I only want to make the subtler point that if 
the supply of organs “diverted” due to permitting a market comes from the 
directed donation from friends and relatives, whatever change in distribution 
occurs is not necessarily normatively problematic, and indeed may be an 
improvement in terms of distributive justice. 79 Of course, if the lion’s share of 
 
 78.  See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 5–6, 20–23 (Rev. ed. 
1982). 
 79.  Another way of seeing this is by imagining ourselves behind a veil of ignorance–type device 
and asking ourselves, not knowing who in a given society we would be, which of the two forms of organ 
distribution we would choose, allowing allocation by ability to pay or by donation from matching 
friends and family who are willing to do so? To the extent one would choose the ability-to-pay 
criterion, that suggests at least that the distribution that results from allowing that system is not more 
unjust than that which results when friends and family can donate if they match. It may be that even 
this more limited argument—that if ability to pay allocation disrupts familial allocation that may not be 
problematic from the perspective of distributive justice⎯is problematic for some communitarians as 
well as other thinkers. In particular, it may be thought that a particular vision of family life, with 
particular kinds of sharing, is essential for the flourishing of human beings and disrupting familial 
sharing disrupts that vision. It is unclear to me that cutting off this particular margin for familial sharing 
is likely to have a major impact, especially since many would choose to donate to family even if there 
were an arm’s length bidder. Even if it did have this impact, I am not sure I agree that the vision is 
worth promoting. Where my critic sees sharing and obligation I also see the potential for coercion 
through emotional pressure. I do not plan on resolving this disagreement here, but merely seek to show 
that it is a highly contestable argument for resisting adoption of more market-like approaches. I should 
also add that many are skeptical about veil of ignorance–type arguments (Rawlsian or otherwise) and 
thank that much of those arguments’ moral force depends on the thickness of the veil, for which there 
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the “diverted” organs comes from those who would have received them based 
on UNOS criteria—not directed donation—then matters look different. 
Second, suppose organ sale both increases the number of quality organs 
available, that is, it is Kaldor–Hicks efficient, but also makes the distribution 
less just, in that those who are less deserving get an organ that would have gone 
to those who are more deserving. Whether this is a problem from the moral 
point of view will depend on several variables in the equation. How many more 
organs are gained? How unjust has the distribution become? How badly off are 
those who have lost out? Even many moral theories with Prioritarian 
components—that is, those that do “not give equal weight to equal benefits, 
whoever receives them,” but instead give more weight to “benefits to the worse 
off”80—only discount benefits to those other than the worst off and do not fail to 
count them entirely. Depending on how much priority is attached to helping the 
worst off, the unfairness of the new distribution may in some instances be 
outweighed by the gain in organs available. Therefore, even for those most 
concerned with distributional justice, organ markets may, in some instances, be 
not only morally acceptable but morally desirable. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
One of the things that is most exciting about this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems is that it attempts to get beyond the typical black-and-
white debate of supporting or opposing organ markets into the finer grey 
normative and regulatory-design questions about what kinds of market 
mechanisms are most appropriate. I have shown how some of the key 
arguments in the debate about whether to permit organ markets—relating to 
corruption, crowding out, coercion, exploitation, undue inducement, 
paternalism, unfair organ distribution—can be used to recommend or oppose 
particular attempts at regulating organ markets. Unfortunately, but 
unsurprisingly, these arguments do not push uniformly in favor of or against a 
particular regulatory proposal, such that we must still determine which of these 
normative reasons to support and how strongly in determining which 
regulations are most desirable. There are also formidable empirical questions 
about the effectiveness of various forms of regulation that I have highlighted in 
making such an evaluation. These are questions that will likely only be 
answered through some amount of policy experimentation. 
I have also shown some complications in the frequent assumption made by 
those opposed to ability or willingness-to-pay allocation systems: At least as to 
cases of directed donation to family members or friends these opponents may 
have erroneously assumed that the distribution of organs in systems where 
compensation is prohibited is itself a just baseline against which to measure the 
 
may not be right answers. 
 80.  E.g., Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 213 (1997). 
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distribution that results when compensation is permitted. 
This article has quite explicitly been pitched at the level of how rational 
analysis can help with policy choice. The emphasis has been on articulating 
public reasons and the regulations they can and cannot support. Of course, 
actual legislative choice happens in a quite different space—one featuring not 
only logrolls, horse trades, and special-interest lobbying, but also considerable 
constraint from “yuck factors” and preferences of the governed that may not 
meet the criteria for public reason or may not even be reflected upon. In their 
article in this issue, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum, and Megan Wright 
instead try to gauge public opinion and also what motivates it on various 
potential reforms.81 One cannot, however, analyze this divergence and the 
related question of when the political theory should bow to public opinion, 
unless one has already undertaken the kind of analysis I have offered here. 
Moreover, if one thinks that these kinds of preferences can or should be 
engaged and potentially altered, this roadmap will provide useful for that 
purpose as well. 
 
 
 81.  Christopher T. Robertson, David V. Yokum & Megan S. Wright, Perceptions of Efficacy, 
Morality, and Politics of Potential Cadaveric Organ Transplantation Reforms, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 101. 
